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Abstract
Contemporary philosophical discussion on the nature of the
imagination has been influenced by recent empirical work in
cognitive science. Our imaginative and emotional engagement
with works of fiction has been explained by appealing to the
similarities between our ordinary cognitive functioning and the
workings of our imagination. Believing and imagining, it is
argued, are governed by a “single code.” I argue against this
claim, and suggest that our imagination – and in particular our
literary imagination – in many respects functions very
differently from ordinary cognition.
Key words
emotional engagement with fictions, make-believe, pretend
play, simulation theory

1. Simulation theory and the single code hypothesis
Contemporary philosophical discussion on the nature of the
imagination has been influenced, in both direction and
substance, by recent empirical work in certain branches of
psychology and cognitive science. Accounts of our emotional
involvement with fictional characters, such as empathy with
and sympathy for the likes of Anna Karenina, have been
explained as appealing to the similarities between our ordinary
cognitive functioning and the workings of our imagination.
Believing and imagining, it is argued, are governed by a
“single code.” This claim is central to simulation theory; its
proponents explain that we react to fictional stories and their
characters in ways that parallel ordinary cognitive or emotional
behavior.[1]
We weep for Anna Karenina, fear for Othello at the hands of
Iago, and pity King Lear, despite knowing that none of these
characters actually exists. Simulation theory purports to
explain how we are able to engage imaginatively with the
mental states of others; it is a theory of mind reading. Not
surprisingly, given its roots in cognitive science, simulation
theory models the imagination on that of ordinary belief
acquisition. Imaginative states are referred to as “pretend
beliefs” or “quasi beliefs” and, notwithstanding central
differences between pretend- or quasi-beliefs and real beliefs,
central structural similarities are preserved. "The basic idea of
the off-line simulation theory of behavior prediction," writes
Stich, Nichols, et al, "is that the practical reasoning component

is taken off line and used for predicting behavior."[2]
Confirmation of this view regarding the relationship between
imagining and believing is found in some recent papers by
Shaun Nichols, who argues that there are “striking similarities
between imagination and belief” that are “partly explained by
the hypothesis that imagination and belief are in a ‘single
code.’”[3] Moreover, Nichols maintains that the intimacy of
the relationship between imagining and believing is attested to
by mainstream cognitive science: “the single code theory, in
one form or another, is embraced by most contemporary
cognitivist accounts of pretence and imagination.”[4] The
account developed by Nichols and others has been shown to
be powerful in its scope of explanation and prediction; it
covers pretend play in children as well as cases of various
kinds of imaginings in adults.
Moreover, Nichols goes on to show how the single-code
hypothesis can usefully explain many puzzles about our
engagement with fictions. For instance, my pity for Lear is
explained by the analogous functioning between my belief
system and my pretend or “make-belief “system, with the
difference being that the latter is run “off-line”: “Since the
‘pity’ response would be activated by the belief, it [the makebelieve pity] is activated by the isomorphic pretence
representation.”[5] The off-line metaphor, and it is important
to note that it is a metaphor, is meant to capture this
isomorphism between believing and make-believing.
Differences are then explained by appealing to differences of
input between the two systems (beliefs vs. make-beliefs),
which may, in turn, generate differences in output. The
account is essentially a functionalist one. The single-code
hypothesis is also invoked to explain the functioning of proper
names in fictions: “[O]ur intuitions about names of fictional
characters parallel in a striking way our intuitions about names
of real individuals with respect to uniqueness and reference;”
tacit beliefs, such as the belief that “Gatsby … has fewer than
one billion hairs on his head,”[6] and certain kinds of
imaginative resistance, such as our unwillingness to imagine in
a fiction that certain things, like murder, are morally
acceptable. Our moral code seems to hold constant across
both fictional and real worlds because imagining that an action
is immoral parallels our believing that it is.
2. Asymmetries
In a later paper,[7] Nichols raises a problem with the singlecode hypothesis: it fails to account for certain asymmetries
between our responses to some imaginary situations and
reality. In other words, there appears to be some
asymmetries between our imaginative responses to fictional
situations and our ordinary responses to the real-life
counterparts of those situations. For example, my feeling of
pity for Lear in relation to the death of Cordelia is not felt as
deeply or as consistently as my pity for a personal friend
whose daughter has died. Nor does it lead me to action: I do
not attempt to comfort Lear in any way or wonder, after
watching a performance of the play, whether I should visit
Cordelia’s grave.
There are also deeper asymmetries, what Nichols calls

“discrepant affect,” such as the laughter evoked by black
comedies towards events that would be horrific were they to
occur in real life. In real life, we would not find the murder of
a shop assistant funny, yet it is precisely this situation
depicted in an episode of Monty Python’s Flying Circus that
does bring us to laughter. Much of the work of film director
Quentin Tarantino relies on this asymmetry in affective
response towards fictional and real-life scenarios by offering us
situations that we feel should offend or revolt us but instead
make us laugh. Notwithstanding the arguments from Gendler,
Walton, and others[8] concerning our “imaginative resistance”
in relation to the endorsement of morally problematic
situations in fiction, it seems that in certain situations we may
be led to adopt ethical systems we disapprove of in real life in
our response to fictions. Anecdotally, a friend of mine, who is
normally mild-mannered and morally virtuous, reported that
he found himself responding in Mafia-style to the fate of a
character while watching The Godfather, agreeing with the don
that a member of “the family” should be “silenced” for his
insubordination.
In “Just the Imagination,” Nichols attempts to explain this
asymmetry, and his solution hinges on the work that desires
play in the formation of emotions. Nichols writes the
following:
When watching Dr. Strangelove, the set of
inferences and activations we have about the
imaginary scenario is shaped by our desires about
what happens in that imaginary scenario. When
it comes to the real world, we have powerful and
consuming desires for the survival of human
life….When it comes to black-comedy, we
typically do not have such powerful desires for
the preservation of human life in the imaginary
scenario. Hence, we are not compelled to draw
out disturbing inferences like billions of innocent
people will die horrifically painful deaths. Rather,
genre considerations make us want to focus
instead on Slim Pickens’ exuberant missile
ride.[9]
Nichols thus wants to explain the asymmetries between our
real-life and fictive responses by appealing to the “differences
in input” between belief and imagination, claiming that in
black-comedy scenarios our desires for the preservation of
human life are not as strong as they are when directed
towards real-life people. The problem is that this is not always
the case; readers care very much about “preserving the life”
of some fictional character, as the responses to the death of
Sherlock Holmes testify. Indeed, many disaster movies appeal
specifically to these concerns about the preservation of human
life, the absence of which would result in audiences simply not
caring about whether the inhabitants of the building in
Towering Inferno make it to safety. It is precisely because we
do care about the death of Desdemona that we feel deeply
moved by the tragedy of Othello.
Such considerations led Dickens to change the ending of Great
Expectations because he felt that an unhappy ending would
justifiably upset readers. Nichols appeals vaguely to “genre

considerations” as crucial for determining the nature of
emotional responses, but how such considerations enable or
disable the usual emotional responses needs to be detailed
more carefully. It is not sufficient to appeal to differences in
input because, of course, one could claim that fictive input is
always different from factual input in that one is fictional and
the other is not.
Yet it is this difference that simulation theory supposedly does
not care about other than that fictive input runs off-line. The
single-code simulation hypothesis purports to explain the
similarity of responses between imagination and belief, with
the focus placed on the representational content of beliefs and
make-beliefs rather than their mode of presentation, that is,
fictional or non-fictional. This was regarded as a virtue of the
account: the single-code hypothesis cannot simply appeal to
aesthetic notions like genre to explain asymmetries without
undermining its own force as an explanatory theory. At least,
not without saying more about it.
3. More than one code?
There is much that is salient in the claims of the single-code
hypothesis, and its power in explaining many of our responses
to fiction is evidenced by its current popularity. It appears to
deal well with explaining certain kinds of imaginative
engagement along with some kinds of pretend play in children.
But, for all that, I would like to suggest, in the discussion on
the nature and functioning of the imagination, that it is not the
only game in town. In some ways, on a simulation account of
the imagination we should not be very surprised to find deeply
embedded symmetries between imagining and believing
because the simulation account is modeled on belief, that is,
the contents of the imagination are cashed out in the language
of belief and cognitive psychology.
Before proceeding with an alternative account of the
imagination, I would like to make the perhaps obvious point
that both the “off-line” analogy and the “single-code”
terminology are metaphorical. There are instances when
Nichols does not explicitly spell out the implications for the
single-code hypothesis and instead the metaphor is employed
to do the explanatory work. As noted above, he takes it as a
counter-example to the hypothesis that there are
asymmetrical emotional responses to many pretend situations
and their real-life counterparts, but does not consider that the
asymmetrical behavioral responses to pretend situations and
their real-life counterparts constitute a challenge to the singlecode hypothesis.
The asymmetries are accounted for by the “off-line” nature of
the pretend response, but we are given no guidelines for
knowing which behavioral responses fall within the scope of
the metaphor and which do not. So the fact that we do not
run up on stage to prevent the murder of Desdemona is
explained by the “off-line” nature of our emotional response.
Yet other behaviors, such as crying or avoiding the dark after
seeing a horror movie, behaviors that are on a par with
responses to similar real-life situations, are seen as consistent
with the “single-code” hypothesis. Thus the appeal of the
“single-code” or “off-line” metaphor is at times vague, and it
is not always clear what kinds of responses, emotional or

behavioral, are consistent with or contradict these
hypotheses.  
4. Child’s play
I would like to suggest that the single-code hypothesis is not
sufficient for explaining many of our emotional responses to
fictions. I argue that our imagination may at times work in
ways that are inconsistent with our ordinary cognitive
engagement: imagining that-p may differ from believing thatp. I would argue that this is particularly true of our
imaginative engagement with many kinds of literary works
that employ devices to pull our imagination in a different
direction from our cognitive engagement. I am not arguing
that it is only literature or the arts that engage our
imaginations in these ways; different artworks and genres may
involve different kinds of issues. But if the case can be made
for our literary imagination, this may pave the way for further
discussion on the other ways in which our imaginations are
engaged.
Let’s start by looking at different ways in which children
engage in pretend play. In arguing that belief and imagination
are functionally isomorphic, Nichols outlines an experiment
conducted by the psychologist Alan Leslie:
Leslie had young children watch as he pretended
to pour tea into two (empty) cups. Then he
picked up one of the cups, turned it over and
shook it, turned it back right side up and placed
it next to the other cup. The children were then
asked to point at the “full cup” and at the
“empty” cup. Both cups were really empty
throughout the entire procedure, but the twoyear-olds reliably indicated that the “empty cup”
was the one that had been turned upside down
and the “full cup” was the other one.[10]
From this Nichols concludes the following:
On the most natural interpretation of this, the
child is imagining that the cup is empty. But the
child also, of course, believes that the cup is
empty. This suggests that the crucial difference
between pretence representations and beliefs is
not given by the content of the
representation.[11]
And so:
The prevailing cognitivist view is that the
pretence representations are processed by the
same inference mechanisms that operate over
real beliefs.[12]
In contrast, the following examples from the psychoanalytic
tradition differ from the cognitive one. In psychoanalytic
literature, play is often understood as a way of dealing with
important emotions that the child is at a loss to articulate,
emotions that he subsequently deals with through play. In the
first account, psychoanalyst Susan Isaacs presents the
observations of a nursery school superintendent concerning her
young charges:

She observed in many cases that when a two-year-old child
was left in the nursery school for the first time and was feeling
lonely and anxious because of the parting with his mother and
being in a strange world, the plaything which most readily
comforted him was the ‘posting box’, a box into which he could
drop through appropriate holes in the lid a number of small
bricks, the lid then being taken off and the lost objects
rediscovered inside. The child thus seemed to be able to
overcome his feelings of loss about his mother by means of
this play, in which he felt lost and rediscovered objects at his
own will.[13]
Here is another example provided by the psychoanalyst Hanna
Segal:
A child’s normal play is a major way of working
through a conflict. I remember watching a boy of
just under three, when his mother was away for
a day giving birth to his first sibling. First he
made a complex rail track for his wooden toy
train. He filled it with little toy people and they
had several crashes. Then he brought in
ambulances. Soon he delineated some fields with
his little bricks and filled them with toy animals.
A complicated play resulted in shifting male,
female, and baby animals in and out of the fields
and train. There were fights and crashes;
ambulances came to the rescue. Throughout, he
was telling himself stories. He introduced bigger
toy men to regulate the traffic, and so on. In
other words, he presented the birth of new babies
and his conflicts about it in very many different
ways. For an interested observer it was
fascinating to watch.[14]
Here the function of playing takes on a significance of a special
kind, one that is not exhausted or fully explained in cognitivist
terms. The children’s play in these examples is symbolic in
ways not apparent to the children themselves. In the
examples provided by Nichols, the children were very much
aware of the symbolic nature of their play. For instance, the
children are aware that the empty cup in reality represents a
full cup in the pretend game. In a game of mud pies, a child
pretends that a pile of mud is a pie, and the child may
manipulate this prop in ways suitable for the game, perhaps by
pretending to eat it, and so on. But in the examples
presented by Isaacs and Segal, there is no straightforward
way in which the children are pretending that this is that.
In the Isaacs example, the little boy is using the game of
posting bricks as a way to overcome his feelings of loss at his
mother’s absence. It would be inappropriate to say that the
child is drawing a conscious comparison between his play
activity and his real world desires. Seeing that the brick game
is directed at or is concerned with the child’s relationship with
his mother requires an act of interpretation. But this does not
negate the claim that what the game is concerned with, what
thoughts and feelings dominate the child’s inner world in play,
are his anxieties concerning his mother’s absence. In this
case, the child’s playing is expressive of his emotional states
rather than being goal directed; in this way it is very different

from the functions of belief-desire pairings, for example, which
work to bring about a certain state of affairs in the real world.
Posting little bricks and then retrieving them is not easily
translatable into a cognitive account in the way that pouring
pretend-tea or pretending to bake mud pies is.
And here we see one difference between imagination and
belief. Given that beliefs are world-oriented, concerned with
and sensitive to truth conditions, they are connected with the
formation of intentions and the execution of action. But
activities of the imagination are often not primarily worlddirected and need not be concerned with or sensitive to truth
conditions. This often results in a difference in the function of
states of the imagination, such as play, and because play
often occurs in symbolic guise, one thing stands for another
and make-beliefs may neither be expressible as coherent
propositions nor follow the logic of propositional states.
One might think that it is only by appealing to psychological
theories, such as psychoanalysis, that deal with deeply
unconscious or repressed material that differences between
believing and imagining can be found. But this is not the case.
Here are some more differences between imagination and
belief:
A child can pretend that a chair is a tank and yet
not expect it to shoot real shells, and there have
been experimental demonstrations that small
children can keep alternative or changing beliefs
in mind if they are doing a task in play rather
than for real. Vygotsky wrote: ‘in play, the child
is always above his average age, above his daily
behavior; in play it is as though he were a head
taller than himself.’ In the world of play it
becomes possible partially to free representations
from their referents and allow these freed
representations to be modified, creating a more
flexible mode of thought that encourages the
emergence of latent mental structures.
Playfulness enables ways of functioning that are
rarely used, developmentally surpassed, or only
just being formed to occupy centre stage.[15]
This is at odds with Nichols’s claim that the content of a
pretend belief does not differ from the content of a real belief
in the same context. To quote him again: “[T]he crucial
difference between pretence representations and beliefs is not
given by the content of the representation.”[16] What Nichols
means by this is that in cases of both pretending and
believing, the mental content is identical. But is it? Let’s take
another look at the Leslie example. The claim is that when the
child pretends that “the cup is empty,” and when she believes
that “the cup is empty,” the representational content, “the cup
is empty,” is identical in both cases.
But in the case of belief, the child’s belief that the cup is
empty sits within a network of a host of other beliefs, such as
the belief that the cup will not transform into a kettle, that it is
not invisible, not likely to grow wings, or not filled with
invisible gremlins. But all of these representational contents
may very well be consistent with the child’s pretend
representation that the cup is empty, depending on the nature

of the game being played. And if, by appealing to the holism
of the mental, the representational content of mental states is
determined in part by relations with other representational
contents, then it seems to follow that the representational
content of a belief and the representational content of a
make-belief are different. In other words, differences in
function in relation to pretending and believing may also bring
with them differences in representational content.
5. Literary engagement
It is important to point out that much of our ordinary thinking
and imaginative activity may often be governed by both
cognitive and imaginative codes simultaneously. Even in cases
of imaginative play heavily imbued with symbolism, it is clear
that children continue to have ordinary beliefs and desires
about the objects of their play. The little boy in the Isaacs
example, above, understood that the bricks he was placing in
the posting box were bricks and not something else.
Moreover, he also knew that ordinarily posting boxes are used
for mailing letters, and it was these beliefs, associations, and
the like that partially determined his play activity. Conversely,
in ordinary cognitive activity, we may often follow a train of
thought whose links are associative rather than logical. We
may use a metaphor to convey an idea that could have been
stated in literal language but would have lacked the emotional
force of a more literary expression. Thus, in practice, it is rare
for either cognitive or imaginative thought processes to be
governed solely by their respective “codes.” This does not
imply that the two different types of mental functioning are
reducible to one another. Nor does it deny that mental
activity is governed by different principles of mental
functioning. The further we enter the realm of the imaginary,
the more likely are we to see stark and irreconcilable
differences between imaginative activity and belief-desire
cognition.
Our engagement with literature likewise may involve more
than one type of mental activity or “code.” I agree with
Nichols that our engagement with fictions can be viewed as an
example of pretend play in adults, although adult fictive
engagement tends to be more passive, a difference that may
result in different emotional responses.[17] I agree, too, that
genre plays a vital role in the way we engage with fictions;
different kinds of fictions will require different kinds of
engagement. It is a mistake to slice representational content
from aesthetic form as their function in shaping emotional
responses is crucial. Our emotional responses are directed at
and governed by more than the plot or story alone. “[F]orm
and content are inseparable,” noted novelist and critic David
Lodge, and “style is not a decorative embellishment upon
subject matter, but the very medium in which the subject is
turned into art.”[18] The philosopher Richard Moran agrees:
If people can respond with emotion to some
nonfigurative work of painting or music, which
provides no scenario for them to make-believe is
true, then perhaps what makes the difference
between works that are emotionally engaging and
those that aren’t is not a matter of aptness for
make-believe or the generation of additional

fictional truths, but rather a difference in certain
other features. In the theater, for instance, we
might think of the various nonmimetic effects of
things such as music (including song), lighting,
figurative language, pacing, and compression of
time, and other effects that provide emotional
punctuation and tone, but do not necessarily
represent anything themselves, and indeed may
be quite mimetically out of place in the scene
presented. They may thus directly impair the
aptness for make-believe, without contributing
any additional fictional truths of their own, while
yet being directly responsible for the emotional
involvement of the audience.[19]
Poetry is a clear example of a genre[20] where the emotional
resonance is typically located not only (or even mainly) in the
subject-matter of the poem but rather in what I’ll term the
'aesthetic elements,' such as association, alliteration, rhyme,
meter, metaphor, imagery, and so on. A case study is Rupert
Brooke’s World War I sonnet, “The Soldier,”[21] which
continues to enjoy wide-spread popularity as shown by its
inclusion in various anthologies. Brooke’s poem arouses the
emotions in ways other than its patriotism. It engages the
imagination in lively and surprising ways, and it is this feature,
I suspect, rather than its pro-English sentiment, that assures
its longevity. The overt sentiment of “The Soldier” espouses
patriotism, in that the speaker urges the reader not to mourn
his death in battle because it serves the noble and worthy
cause of fighting and dying in the service of one’s country.
But the emotional pull on the reader is achieved through other
means.
The imagery of the sonnet, a form traditionally used for a love
poem, traces a movement from death to life. It begins with
an emphasis on death – “If I should die” – and ends with a
vision of eternity and the afterlife – “Under an English
heaven.” In the poem the speaker is resurrected, altered from
a piece of earth – “some corner of a foreign field” – to a
breathing, speaking, being. The line that begins, “A dust
whom England bore” echoes the creation of humans by the
God of Genesis, who breathed life into inert clay. The octave
focuses on the reawakening of the physical being of the soldier
by emphasizing the body and physical activity: He roamed the
paths of England, breathed her air, and so on.
In the sestet, the imagery shows activities less physical and
more intellectual and emotional: the soldier is transformed
from a piece of earth into a “pulse in the eternal mind.” Note
the emphasis on “thoughts,” “sights and sounds,” “dreams,”
and “laughter” in the activities of thinking and learning. Not
only does the poem describe these activities, it also induces
the reader to adopt the perspective of the soldier: we too are
urged to sense those “sights and sounds,” to dream along with
him. The reader moves from a position of thinking about the
soldier to one of thinking and feeling with him. The dead
soldier comes alive by being thought about by the reader, and
he begins to live through the reader as we come to view the
world through his eyes. This completes the resurrection of the
dead soldier. Through the act of reading, he gains new life,
and the reader becomes the vehicle of this resurrection.

It is this kind of creative engagement, one that depends not so
much upon the overt sentiment or theme of the poem,
whereby the work achieves its greatest effect. This effect
depends upon the way the formal elements of the poem, that
is, its imagery, rhythm, rhyme scheme, and structure, work
together. The literary elements influence the reader’s
engagement with the poem in unconscious ways that require
some detailed analysis in order to be discovered.
It would be difficult to explain our emotional involvement with
“The Soldier” if pretend-beliefs and ordinary beliefs were
functionally isomorphic. If I am right that the soldier comes to
life emotionally through the reader’s engagement with the
poem, this cannot be fully explained by thinking of our literary
imagination as akin to ordinary belief.   For one thing, we have
no way of knowing how we would react were we to believe
that the dead can be resurrected. It is crucial that “The
Soldier” asks us to contemplate a state of affairs, a
resurrection, that could not happen in reality, because the
poem invites the reader to engage in an act of reverie very
different from ordinary thinking. It is part of the function of
the poem to make us think impossible thoughts and to lead us
away from ordinary mundane life and not towards it.
The poem uses a variety of literary techniques, including
allusion, rhythm, and meter, and thereby draws from the
reader a variety of emotional responses that have no clear
parallel in ordinary psychological experiences. Certainly not all
poetry draws us away from ordinary life; but even where the
poetic focus is on the everyday, poetry, and especially great
poetry, brings an extraordinary attention that rises above the
commonplace and allows us to see things anew.[22] Peter
Lamarque makes the point that our cognitive and emotional
responses to poetry are often very different from our ordinary
responses. In response to Ben Jonson’s “On My First Son,”
which speaks of the death of the poet’s seven-year old child,
Lamarque writes that the poem “is an expression of grief, not
the grief expressed.”[23] What he seems to mean by this is
that the poetic expression of a psychological state is not to be
confused with the psychological state itself, that is, poetic
expression is a crafted construction: “To understand the
emotions expressed in lyric poetry we need to know not about
psychology but about poetry, its conventions and powers.”[24]
Conversely, engagement by readers with works of poetry will
evoke and invoke imaginative responses different in important
respects from our everyday cognitive and emotional
responses.   We respond not only with pity to Ben Jonson’s
poem but also with a joyful delight at the beauty of the poem
and an admiration for its measured tone and lack of
sentimentality. Imaginative engagement not only deepens our
emotional engagement in many ways but it also broadens it:
it opens our minds to ways of responding that ordinary
cognitive behavior cannot.
Poetry, because it is highly stylized, is perhaps one of the
clearest examples of the differences between imaginative and
ordinary “cognitive” thinking.[25] More “realistic” genres,
such as the novel, often attempt to elide the distinction
between their fictional worlds and the real world, and
encourage their readers to feel emotional responses more akin

to ordinary real-life responses. But even the clear-sighted
realism of Jane Austen’s writing is achieved precisely by the
use of figurative elements in language.[26] In discussing a
passage from Persuasion, the literary critic Stephen Booth
notes that “the special quality of Jane Austen’s vision of
experience” is “communicated to us through a special kind of
language, language which is more than the transparent
container of Ideas.”[27] The famous opening sentences of
Pride and Prejudice invite the reader into a world where
property and possessions are important in defining status:
It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a
single man in possession of a good fortune must
be in want of a wife. However little known the
feelings or views of such a man may be on his
first entering a neighborhood, this truth is so well
fixed in the minds of the surrounding families,
that he is considered as the rightful property of
someone or other of their daughters.
The irony of Austen’s opening sentences allows us to adopt
multiple viewpoints simultaneously: we are made aware of the
ambitions of the families to which we will soon be introduced,
and the importance of status is highlighted. The ironic tone
alerts the reader to the fact that the narrator or author may
not share the values of her character; the irony is subtle,
though, mixing criticism with sympathy. Note also the way in
which the second sentence functions as a kind of literary
camera lens, moving from the “neighborhood” to the
“surrounding families” to “someone or other of their
daughters,” and finally to Mrs. Bennet, who speaks in the next
sentence. These superbly constructed sentences allow the
reader to engage with the events as they are being narrated
while simultaneously wondering what the author thinks about
her characters.
Another way of putting this is to suggest that Austen’s writing
leads us to think about how we read. Even as we engage with
the fictional events, we adopt several viewpoints
simultaneously. This kind of multiple-perspective taking does
not typically happen in ordinary cognition. I do not suggest
that it cannot, but the delicate literary constructions of a great
writer like Austen open our imaginations in ways different from
ordinary thinking, and this is part of the pleasure that reading
gives us. Literary style shapes our imagination in ways that
ordinary cognition does not, and perhaps cannot.
6. Conclusion
A full defense of my claim that imagination and belief are not
governed by a “single code” would require a much longer and
more detailed defense than the limits of this paper provide,
and it would require nuanced discussion of genre and other
aesthetic considerations. There are important differences
between various literary genres that only detailed discussion
can foreground. For instance, the ways in which the different
elements of classical tragedy, such as form, content, dramatic
structure, language, and so on, give rise to the “singular
phenomenon” of tragic pleasure (as noted by Hume), require a
different kind of psychological engagement and, hence,
explanation from the ways in which black comedies move us to
laughter. Such explorations must be left for another time.  

However, the general point holds, namely that works of
literature engage us imaginatively in ways that very often
differ fundamentally from ordinary cognition.   The
psychologist Donald Winnicott noted that play provides
children a relief from “the strain of relating inner and outer
reality.”[28] Likewise, literature provides adults with ways in
which the imagination allows us, albeit temporarily, to avoid
the strains of dealing with, in the words of T. S. Eliot, “very
much reality.”[29]
Appendix
The Soldier, by Rupert Brooke

If I should die, think only this of me:
That there's some corner of a foreign field
That is forever England. There shall be
In that rich earth a richer dust concealed;
A dust whom England bore, shaped, made aware,
Gave, once, her flowers to love, her ways to roam,
A body of England's, breathing English air,
Washed by the rivers, blest by suns of home.

And think, this heart, all evil shed away,
A pulse in the eternal mind, no less
Gives somewhere back the thoughts by England given;
Her sights and sounds; dreams happy as her day;
And laughter, learnt of friends; and gentleness,
In hearts at peace, under an English heaven.
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